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1 INTRODUCTION  
As AEC (ASEAN Economic Community) has been 
enacted, companies in Indonesia are facing a more 
difficult competition. Therefore, financial stability is 
one of the main strengths in seizing the opportunity 
and avoiding external environmental threats. In this 
case, efficient corporate governance mechanism will 
cause the reduction of debts which eventually reduce 
the risk of financial stability in the company (Dimi-
tropoulos 2014). Therefore, corporate governance 
mechanism is required for managing the capital 
structure of the company optimally so that the bal-
ance between risk and the return of debt and capital 
composition can be achieved. An optimal composi-
tion will lead the company to achieve its objective 
which is to maximize the company's value.  
The research on capital structure is conducted in 
order to achieve the best combination of the best 
capital structure in a company. A non-optimal capi-
tal structure will increase company cost that even-
tually suppresses the profit of the company.  
Sheikh & Wang (2012) stated that director size 
has a positive effect on debt ratio. In other words, 
the more board members of a company, the bigger 
the debt composition applied.  
Dimitropoulos (2014) stated that outside commis-
sioner has a negative effect on debt ratio. The bigger 
the number of the board member from outside the 
company, the lower the composition of the debt to-
wards the equity. Dimitropoulos (2014) stated that 
the existence of the independent commissioner in the 
board will lead to the lower use of leverage because 
of the strict supervision and control, so the agency 
conflict between the directors and the stakeholders 
can be avoided. In line with the condition, Dimitro-
poulos (2014) stated that the application of corporate 
governance practice (such as independent board) 
may be an important mechanism to manage the or-
ganization based on transparency, accountability, 
and justice principals, so that exposure on leverage 
may be limited. 
The research conducted by Hasan & Butt (2009) 
found that there is a negative effect of managerial 
ownership on debt ratio. It suggests that the bigger 
the ownership of the management (board of direc-
tors), the lower the debt composition in the compa-
ny. It may be caused by the idea that the higher the 
debt composition in the company, the bigger the risk 
of default. This condition is in conflict with the ma-
nagerial interest in the long-term sustainability of the 
company.  
The effect of corporate governance on the capital structure : an 
Indonesian case   
Arif Herlambang, Werner Ria Murhadi & Giovani Anggasta Susanto  










ABSTRACT: The purpose of the research was to analyze the effect of Corporate Governance on the Compa-
ny’s Capital Structure. The variable used in this study were director size, outside commissioner, director own-
ership, institutional investor, audit quality, CEO tenure, size, growth, profitability, and intangible asset. This 
research used a quantitative approach with multiple linear regression analysis model. This research used sam-
ples taken from non-financial sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2011-2015. 
The number of samples used in this research was 300 observations. It was found that the whole variables were 
significant at the level of 5% except for growth variable and intangible asset was significant at the level of 
10%. 
Keywords: corporate governance, capital structure, outsider commissioner, institutional investor, intangible 
asset  
40Copyright © 2018, the Authors.  Published by Atlantis Press. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR), volume 186
15th International Symposium on Management (INSYMA 2018)
The research conducted by Hussainey & Aljifri 
(2012) shows that there is a negative effect of an in-
stitutional investor on debt ratio. In this case, the 
higher the ownership of the institutional investor, the 
greater the use of debt in the company. The institu-
tional investor functions as an effective tool to moni-
tor the corporate strategic decision, lower the agency 
cost, and reduce the chance of arbitrary action of the 
board of directors (Hasan & Butt 2009). Having the 
supervision of the institutional investor, the confi-
dence of the public and other creditors may grow, 
and it can be easier for the company to get a loan.  
Chang et al. (2009) show that audit quality has a 
negative effect on debt. It means that the better the 
audit quality, the lower the use of debt in the com-
pany. A company with a higher external audit quali-
ty (audited by the big-4) reported that there was an 
improvement in the quality of the financial report 
marked by the decreasing information asymmetry 
which in turn may decrease the equity cost. As a re-
sult, the company would prefer to use equity funding 
to debt. 
According to Dimitropoulos (2014), CEO tenure 
has a positive effect on debt ratio. It means that the 
longer the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) holds his 
position, the more the amount of the company debt. 
In his research, CEO tenure was used as the instru-
ment of CEO duality. According to Baatwah (2015), 
a CEO with a long tenure has a better and active ac-
counting skill in improving the strategic decision 
and a better company’s financial report. As a result, 
the company with a better financial report will be 
easier in getting a loan from the bank because the 
bank believes that the company will be able to settle 
loan principal as well as the interest.  
According to Dimitropoulos (2014) and Hussai-
ney & Aljifri (2012), size has a positive effect on 
debt ratio. The bigger the size of the company, the 
higher the debt composition. This was also proven 
by James (1987) and Ojah & Manrique (2005) in 
Dimitropoulos (2014) which shows that major com-
panies have a higher quality project in their portfo-
lio, so they tend to fund the projects through bank 
loans in order to avoid the spread of information to 
their competitors. A big company may also expe-
rience overinvestment where the manager tries to 
fund the projects through loans. Besides, Chang et 
al. (2006) in Dimitropoulos (2014) shows that bigger 
companies, in general, have a higher risk than their 
smaller partners, and they are likely to issue debt in-
stead of equity. 
According to Oino & Ukaegbu (2015), growth 
has a significant positive effect on debt. It means 
that the faster the company grows, the bigger the 
debt composition compared to the equity possessed. 
Um (2001) in Murhadi (2011) also stated that a 
growing business suffers pressure in funding in-
vestment opportunities if the investment is higher 
than the retained profit. In other words, a growing 
company has the tendency to use debt because the 
retained profit is insufficient in funding the invest-
ment opportunities.  
According to Dimitropoulos (2014) and Sheikh & 
Wang (2012), profitability has a negative effect on 
debt ratio. It means that the more profitable the 
company, the lower the use of debt in the company. 
A company with a high profit tends to use the re-
tained profit as the source of funding. If the internal 
funding is sufficient, the company does not have to 
apply for external funding.  
According to Dimitropoulos (2014), intangible 
asset has a positive effect on debt ratio. It means that 
the bigger the intangible asset in a company, the 
higher the use of debt on the equity.  
Based on the explanation above, this research was 
focused on observing the effect of corporate gover-
nance on capital structure. 
2 RESEARCH METHODS  
This research was conducted to test the effect of 
Corporate Governance measured using independent 
variables (director size, outside commissioner, ma-
nagerial ownership, institutional investor, audit qual-
ity, and CEO tenure) and control variables (size, 
growth, profitability, and intangible asset) towards 
the capital structure which were measured using de-
pendent variable (debt ratio) in the non-financial 
sector businesses listed on the Indonesia Stock Ex-
change (BEI) in 2011 – 2015. 
The dependent variable in this research was the 
debt ratio which was measured through the total of 
the debt divided by the total asset. Meanwhile, the 
independent variable of director size was measured 
by the number of board of directors. The outside 
commissioner was measured by the number of the 
independent commissioners. The managerial owner-
ship was measured by the proportion of the stock 
held by the directors. The institutional investor was 
measured by the proportion of the stock held by the 
institutional investor. The audit quality was meas-
ured by the result of the audit "1" by the Big-4 and 
"0" by the others. The CEO tenure was measured by 
the duration of the position as the CEO.  
The control variables like the size, which was 
measured by natural logarithm of the total asset, and 
growth which was measured by the net income this 
year divided by the net income in the t year divided 
by the t-1 year. While the profitability was measured 
by the net income divided by the total asset. Finally, 
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the intangible asset was measured by the intangible 
asset divided by the total asset. 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
The following regression test result table shows the 
results of the research: 
Table 1. Regression test result  
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  
C -1.726891 -22.98275 
DIR_SIZE -0.022018 -11.23014*** 
OUT_COM -0.032543 -4.665371*** 
MAN_OWN 0.540747 15.17841*** 
INST_OWN 0.331755 21.09926*** 
AUD -0.055943 -10.88901*** 
TENURE 0.001413 4.751806*** 
SIZE 0.075902 28.35210*** 
GROWTH 0.038599 1.935447* 
PROF -0.569181 -10.97940*** 
INT_ASSET 0.044004 1.654976* 
Notes:  *  : significance at 10% 
   ** : significance at 5% 
   *** : significance at 1% 
 
Table 1 shows that the variable is significant at 
5% level, except for the growth variable, and the in-
tangible asset is significant at 10% level.  
The director size variable has a significant nega-
tive relationship with the debt ratio. It is because the 
directors prefer lower debts than optimal debts (as 
low as possible) as the directors want to lower the 
corporate risk. Besides, the directors are not apt to 
pressure. If the directors have more debts, there will 
be more parties monitoring their performance. 
Hence, many directors prefer less debt in the com-
panies (Berger et al. 1997). 
Outside commissioner has a significant negative 
relationship with the debt ratio. It is because the ex-
istence of independent commissioner in the board 
will lead to the low use of leverage because of the 
strict supervision and control, so the agency conflict 
between the directors and stakeholders can be 
avoided (Dimitropoulos 2014). 
Managerial ownership variable has a significant 
positive relationship with the debt ratio. It is because 
the director acts as the shareholders who will try to 
improve the value of the company because the direc-
tor has the same interest as the shareholders. There-
fore, the possibility of agency problem is smaller 
and a bank will be more confident in granting loans. 
In addition, the director will prefer to fund the new 
investments through loans instead of equity (Dimi-
tropoulos 2014). 
The institutional ownership variable had a signif-
icant positive relationship with the debt ratio. It is 
because of the supervision of the institutional inves-
tor, the confidence of the public and other creditors 
may grow, and it can be easier for the company to 
get a loan (Hasan & Butt 2009).  
The audit quality variable had a significant nega-
tive relationship with the debt ratio. It is because a 
company with a higher external audit quality (au-
dited by the Big-4) reported that there was an im-
provement in the quality of the financial report 
marked by the decreasing information asymmetry 
which in turn may decrease the equity cost. As a re-
sult, the company would prefer to use equity funding 
to debt (Chang et al. 2009).  
The CEO tenure variable had a significant posi-
tive relationship with the debt ratio. It is because the 
CEO with a long tenure has a better and active ac-
counting skill in improving the strategic decision 
and a better company’s financial report. As a result, 
the company with a better financial report will be 
easier in getting a loan from the bank because the 
bank believes that the company will be able to settle 
loan principal as well as the interest (Baatwah 2015).  
The size variable shows a significant positive re-
lationship with the debt ratio. It is because major 
companies have a higher quality project in their port-
folio, so they tend to fund the projects through bank 
loans in order to avoid the spread of information to 
their competitors (Dimitropoulos 2014).  
The growth variable had a significant positive re-
lationship with the debt ratio. It is because that a 
growing business suffers pressure in funding in-
vestment opportunities if the investment is higher 
than the retained profit. In other words, a growing 
company has the tendency to use debt because the 
retained profit is insufficient in funding the invest-
ment opportunities (Murhadi, 2011).  
The profitability variable had a significant nega-
tive relationship with the debt ratio. It is because a 
company with a high profit tends to use the retained 
profit as the source of funding (pecking order 
theory).  
The intangible asset variable had a significant 
positive relationship with the debt ratio. It is because 
a company that holds the brand with good reputation 
(intangible asset) will get loans easier from banks 
because they believe in the capability of the compa-
nies in settling the debt (Benkraiem et al. 2011) 
4  CONCLUSION  
Based on the research, it was found that all variables 
were significant at 5% level, except for growth and 
intangible asset which were significant at 10% level. 
The researchers hope that this research can give the 
illustration for the companies in terms of the effect 
of the governance towards the corporate capital 
structure in which an optimal capital structure com-
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bination may affect the decrease of cost and ex-
penses of the company. Companies (especially in 
Indonesia) may take this research into consideration 
in making a decision on the capital structure selec-
tion. 
For the investors, this research is expected to give an 
illustration of the effect of corporate governance on 
the company's capital structure. A healthy company 
shows good governance. Investors may take this re-
search into consideration of the issues related to the 
factors of corporate governance (director size, out-
side commissioner, managerial ownership, institu-
tional investor, audit quality, CEO tenure, size, 
growth, profitability, and intangible asset) before in-
vesting on the stocks of the companies in Indonesia. 
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